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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
INTRODUCTION
The Villanova Law Review in 1968 published a lengthy Comment
entitled Products Liability In Pennsylvania,' the avowed purpose of which
was "to provide the Pennsylvania practitioner with a compilation of the
pertinent decisions of Pennsylvania courts in the area of products liability."'2
However, since the time of publication, a number of significant decisions
interpreting Pennsylvania law have been rendered by both the state and
federal courts. Two of these decisions resulted in a marked departure
from prior precedent, and the remaining four provided a much needed
amplification on the present state of products liability law in Pennsylvania.
It is the purpose of this discussion, therefore, to update the 1968 Comment
and to provide the Pennsylvania practitioner with an analysis of the most
recent decisions affecting the law of products liability in Pennsylvania.
I. THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN WARRANTY
A. Privity
In Kassab v. Central Soya,3 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
abolished the requirement of vertical privity of contract 4 when suing in
assumpsit against a remote manufacturer for breach of warranty, thereby
specifically overruling Miller v. Preitz,5 decided only two years prior.
Justice Roberts, speaking for the Kassab court, based the holding on two
separate grounds: the need for symmetry in the law; and the comments
of the original drafters of section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
With respect to the first basis, the court found that prior to Pennsyl-
vania's adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
a compelling argument for retaining the vertical privity requirement could
be made; abolishment of vertical privity would allow recovery against the
1. 13 VILL. L. Riv. 793 (1968).
2. Id.
3. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
4. "Vertical privity" involves the question of which members of the distributive
chain may be sued; whereas "horizontal privity" concerns itself with the problem of
who may bring suit. Under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Pennsyl-
vania, horizontal privity is limited to
any natural person who is in the family or household of the . . . [the] buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Supp. 1969). Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, on the other hand, extends horizontal privity to the "ultimate
user or consumer" and expresses no opinion as to other injured persons. RESTATEMENT
(SecoND) op TORTS § 402A, caveat 1 at 348 (1965). See Comment, Products Liability
In Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. L. Rgv. 793, 824-28, 842-47 (1968).
5. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
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remote manufacturer without proof of negligence when suing in assumpsit
under the Code, but when suing in trespass, negligence on the part of
the manufacturer had to be shown to permit recovery for the same
wrong against the same defendant. Recovery would thus depend solely
on the label plaintiff chose to give his complaint. However, with the
adoption of section 402A in Webb v. Zern6 the same evil arose. Under
section 402A, recovery in a trespass action against the remote manufac-
turer may be had without a showing of either negligence or privity, since
strict liability against all parties in the chain of distribution results for any
damage inflicted upon the person or property of the plaintiff as a result
of a defective product.7 Thus, unless the requirement of vertical privity
were abolished in assumpsit actions as well, recovery would again depend
on the caption at the top of plaintiff's complaint. The Kassab court con-
cluded that such a "dichotomy of result" should not exist in the law, and
therefore held that on the issue of vertical privity, "the code must be
coextensive with Restatement section 402a in the case of product liability."
The Kassab court also examined comment 3 to section 2-318 of the
Code0 which specifically states that
the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
This language indicated to the court that section 2-318 was never intended
to set any limits on vertical privity, and the court concluded that Pennsyl-
vania should join the growing list of jurisdictions 0 which have judicially
abolished the requirement of vertical privity in breach of warranty cases.
The Kassab court made it clear that its decision with respect to
vertical privity has no impact on the issue of horizontal privity," and
therefore, at this point, only the buyer and the other beneficiaries enumer-
ated in section 2-318 of the Code may maintain a warranty action.' 2
6. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A & comment a at 348 (1965).
8. 432 Pa. at 231, 246 A.2d at 854.
9. As originally enacted in Pennsylvania, section 1-102(3) (f) of the Uniform
Commercial Code provided that the official comments of the drafters could be used as
an aid in construing the statute. Act of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3, § 1-102. However, the
reenactment of the Code in 1959 failed to provide this specific reference to the com-
ments. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-102 (Supp. 1969). The Kassab court noted
this deletion, but felt that it was not significant. 432 Pa. at 233 n.9, 246 A.2d at 855 n.9.
10. E.g., Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D.
Del. 1967) (applying Va. law) ; Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55
Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) ; Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. App. 1962) ;
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber Co., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d
449 (1961) ; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonary Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
1963) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363,181 N.E.2d 399 (1962); Ford Motor Co. v. Grimes, 408 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966).
11. 432 Pa. at 232 n.8, 246 A.2d at 855 n.8.
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), noted in 33
BROOKLYN L. Rvv. 334 (1967), 16 DRAKE L. REv. 115 (1967), 15 KAN. L. Rev. 219(1966), 43 N.D. L. R4v. 560 (1967), 12 N.Y.L.F. 530 (1966), 20 VAND. L. REv. 665
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B. Damages
The issue of what types of damages are recoverable under the Code
was also presented to the court in Kassab. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged
that defendant's inclusion of a foreign substance in its cattle feed had
caused plaintiffs' cows to abort and their bull to become sterile. As a
result, plaintiffs claimed that they were unable to sell their breeding stock
except at beef prices, thus greatly diminishing the value of their property,
and sought recovery in an amount equal to the diminution in value of
their cattle.
Initially, the court noted that since direct "economic loss" - "the
diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality" -
is clearly compensable under Restatement section 402A, it should be com-
pensable under the Code as well, 13 for the same reasons of legal symmetry
that necessitated the abolishment of vertical privity. However, the loss
that plaintiffs were seeking in the instant case was not the difference
between the product as warranted and the product as received, but rather
was a loss directly resulting from defendant's breach of warranty. This,
the court felt, was clearly compensable under section 2-715(2) (b) of the
Code, which provides:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach in-
clude ....
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty. 14
Therefore, the court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs the opportunity
to prove that their stock had become unmarketable as breeding animals
and that the unmarketability of the cattle was the proximate result of
defendant's breach of warranty.15
(1967), and 8 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 694 (1967); Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414
Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964), noted in 17 ALA. L. REv. 92 (1964), 14 CATHOLIC U.L.
Rv. 133 (1965), 14 DFPAUL L. Rev. 177 (1964), 48 MARQ. L. Rzv. 273 (1964), 25
MD. L. REv. 80 (1965), 17 VAND. L. Rev. 1537 (1964), and 10 VILL. L. Rev. 607
(1965) ; Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), noted in
67 DICK. L. REv. 428 (1963), 51 Geo. L.J. 860 (1963), 25 U. PITT. L. Rev. 99 (1963),
49 VA. L. Riv. 1040 (1963), and 65 W. VA. L. Rev. 326 (1963); Comment, supra
note 5, at 824-28.
13. 432 Pa. at 231 n.7, 246 A.2d at 854-55 n.7. See Dyson v. General Motors
Corp., No. 43060, at 13 n.9 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 17, 1969) ; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) ; Santor v.
A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) ; Comment, supra note 5,
at 847-48. But see Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965) ; Miller v. Prietz, 422 Pa. 383, 410-11, 221 A.2d 320, 335 (1966) (con-
curring-dissenting opinion) ; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California,
18 HASTINGs L.J. 9, 35 (1966) ; Comment, supra note 5, at 847-48. See generally
Comment, Economic Loss In Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUm. L. Rev.
917 (1966); Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchaser for "Economic
Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract, 114 U. PA. L. Rev. 539 (1966).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-715 (2) (b) (Supp. 1969).
15. 432 Pa. 217, 236-37, 246 A.2d 848, 857-58 (1968).
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Justice Roberts emphasized in a footnote, 6 however, that recovery
for diminution in value of specific property affected by seller's defective
product must be clearly distinguished from the "loss of good will to a
business" resulting from the community's knowledge that the business had
at one time sold defective products.17 He stated that this latter loss is,
under the rationale of Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe
Co.,18 "too speculative" and therefore "not a compensable element of
damages under section 2-715 of the code."' 19
This dictum by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to place
it in direct conflict with the position taken by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Neville Chemical Co.
v. Union Carbide Corp.,20 a case decided only two weeks after Kassab.
The district court, applying Pennsylvania law, held that loss of profits are
compensable both in tort and contract where there is evidence to establish
such a loss with reasonable certainty and to show that the loss was a
proximate consequence of the wrong. Also, in contract actions, such a loss
is compensable if it is within the contemplation of the parties.
A closer look at the court's decision in Neville, however, demonstrates
that it should not be interpreted as broadly as the court's language in-
dicates. Although the court stated that the loss of profits as a result of
breach of warranty is compensable under sections 2-714(2) and 2-715(2)
of the Uniform Commercial Code when that loss is within the contempla-
tion of the parties,21 it concluded that since negligence had also been
established by the plaintiff, the "contemplation of the parties" element was
not material to its decision.22
On the issue of whether loss of profits are too speculative to be com-
pensable, the federal district court found that plaintiff had shown by the
testimony of its former customers that they had abruptly ceased to buy
from plaintiff, either temporarily or permanently, when they discovered
the defective nature of plaintiff's product.2 Since this evidence clearly
established both the relationship between the defect in the product and the
loss of profits, and the extent and duration of such loss, and since damages
of this nature have been allowed in both contract 24 and tort25 actions in
prior Pennsylvania decisions, the court concluded that the jury's award
of damages for loss of profits should be allowed to stand.20
16. Id. at 237 n.12, 246 A.2d at 857 n.12.
17. Id.
18. 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
19. 432 Pa. at 237 n.12, 246 A.2d at 857 n.12.
20. 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
21. Id. at 661.
22. Id. at 661-62.
23. Id. at 660-61.
24. See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Blocked Iron Corp., 200 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.
Pa. 1961) ; Taylor v. Kaufhold, 368 Pa. 538, 84 A.2d 347 (1951) ; Western Show Co. v.
Mix, 308 Pa. 215, 162 A. 667 (1932), aff'd after remand, 315 Pa. 139, 173 A. 183 (1934).
25. Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268 (M.D.
Pa.), af'd, 387 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1967) ; Kosco v. Hachmeister, Inc., 396 Pa. 288,
152 A.2d 673 (1959) ; Ashcraft v. C.G. Hussey & Co., 359 Pa. 129, 58 A.2d 170 (1936).
26. 294 F. Supp. at 662.
[VOL. 14
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Thus, the law of Pennsylvania with respect to the compensability of
loss of profits under the Code appears to be somewhat in doubt. The
Pennsylvania supreme court still holds to the position that such damages
are always too speculative and therefore not compensable, whereas the
federal district court's position is that such damages, in certain circum-
stances, can be proven with reasonable certainty. The decision in Neville,
however, is not dispositive on the issue of whether, once the loss has been
clearly proven, it is compensable under the Code. The tenor of the opinion
indicates that it would be, but the decision was limited by the fact that
plaintiff had proven both breach of warranty and negligence.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
A. Introduction
There have been four recent decisions 27 applying the Pennsylvania law
of strict liability for a seller who creates a "product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer," as provided in Restate-
nent (Second) of Torts 402A. Pennsylvania courts have had only two
years experience with section 402A, but these decisions settle to a great
extent what has been described as an "unsettled" area of the law in
Pennsylvania. 28
B. Defendants Under 402A
In Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,29 plaintiffs brought
an action in both negligence and strict liability under section 402A for
fire damages allegedly resulting from: (1) the defective design of a
gasoline hose supplied by defendant Humble Oil; and (2) the defective
design of a casting and the failure to provide a "fail safe" device by
defendant O.A. Smith Corp., the successor-in-interest to the manufacturer
of the gasoline pump. The district court3" found that the accident resulted
not from any defect in the hose or the pump, but rather from "the failure
of the driver whose duty it was to remove the nozzle from the filler pipe
before driving away from the pump, so to do."'" On appeal, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
With respect to the negligence issue, the Speyer court affirmed, finding
that the sequence of events which resulted in the accident was not within
the realm of forseeability, and therefore neither defendant had a duty to
provide against the occurrence of such events.3 2 With respect to the strict
27. Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Speyer, Inc. v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968) ; Dyson v. General Motors
Corp., Civil No. 43060 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 17, 1969); Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa.
351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
28. Comment, supra note 5, at 832.
29. 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968).
30. Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
31. Id. at 871.
32. Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766, 771 (3d Cir. 1968).
COMMENTS
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liability claim, the court held that, although defendant O.A. Smith Corp.
could be considered a "seller"3 3 of the pump, it could not be held liable
because the product had not reached the ultimate user or consumer "with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it was sold," 34 as required
under section 402A. The court felt that the addition of the new flexiglass
hose by Humble constituted a substantial modification of the original
product.3 5 As to defendant Humble Oil, the court held that it could not
be classified as a "seller," much less "a seller engaged in the business of
selling such a product," within the provisions of section 402A, 16 since
"Humble was not in the business of selling pumps. '37
The Speyer court's reasoning can be criticized in that it would tend
to exempt from liability manufacturers and sellers of products that ; equire
the subsequent addition of component parts as well as the manufacturers
and sellers of the component parts themselves. Such a rule is contrary
to the line of cases which have held the manufacturers of component
parts liable for negligence, 38 or which have held the manufacturer or
33. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 402A, comment f at 350-51 (1965);
Comment, supra note 5, at 846.
34. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 402A(1) (b) (1965). However, com-
ment p to section 402A specifically states that
the Institute has refrained from taking any position as to the possible liability
of the seller where the product is expected to, and does, undergo further processing
or other substantial change after it leaves his hands and before it reaches those
of the ultimate user or consumer.
Id. at 357.
35. 403 F.2d at 771-72.
36. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 402A(1) (a) (1965). See note 34 supra.
37. 275 F. Supp. 861, 868 (W.D. Pa.), quoted in 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1968).
The Speyer court also resisted the plaintiffs' argument that the pump was a "container"
for Humble's product, and therefore Humble should be held liable under the line of
cases which have held the distributors of food products liable for container explosions.
See, e.g., Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968) ; Webb
v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). With respect to this argument, the
Speyer court held that the product and the container must be sold as an "integrated
whole" and that under the facts this notion was "inconceivable." 403 F.2d at 772.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 402A, comment h at 352 (1965), where it
is stated that "[n]o reason is apparent for distinguishing between the product itself
and the container in which it is supplied; and the two are purchased by the user or
consumer as an integrated whole." See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. Rxv. 791 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Guarnieri v. Kewanee-Ross Corp., 263 F.2d 413, modified on
rehearing, 270 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1959) (manufacturer of cylinder for guided missile) ;
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Tiatan Valve & Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1957) (liability of manufacturer of component part to injured person
recognized but indemnity denied because of negligence of assembler in failing to
properly inspect or test the valve) ; Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1944)
(manufacturer of semi-trailer chassis to which fuel tank was added) ; Noel v. United
Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963) (propellor manufacturer) ; Mary-
land v. Garzell Plastics Indus., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1957) (manufacturer
of hull of boat) ; Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 429, 336 P.2d 286(1959) (manufacturer of defective safety belt ring inserted by belt manufacturer);
Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 342 Ill. App. 602, 97 N.E.2d 620 (1951) (manufac-
turer of cable used in elevator) ; Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163,
99 N.W.2d 627 (1959) (manufacturer of power brake master cylinder) ; Smith v.
Peerless Glass, 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932) (manufacturer of bottle filled
with soda by another). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 402A, comment q
at 358 (1965), where it is stated:
The same problem arises in cases of the sale of a component part of a product
to be assembled by another, as for example a tire to be placed on a new auto-
mobile, a brake cylinder for the same purpose, or an instrument for the panel
[VOL. 14
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seller of replacement parts liable either for negligence 9 or in 3trict
liability.40
However, the court noted that even if plaintiffs in this particular case
had surmounted the hurdle of establishing Humble as a seller, they would
probably have been unable to show that the hose and the pump were sub-
jected to "normal handling," as required by comment h to section 402A. 41
Thus, what at first appears to be of an unsatisfactory result with respect
to the issues of "substantial change" and "a seller engaged in the business of
selling such a product" may be explained by this further finding of the court.
C. Defenses
There have also been three recent appellate court decisions applying
Pennsylvania law which have dealt primarily with the concepts of "intended
use" and the "unreasonably dangerous" character of the product.
In Bartkewich v. Billinger,4 2 the Pennsylvania supreme court held that
plaintiff could not recover for injuries sustained while attempting to remove
a jammed piece of glass from a glass crushing machine. The court decided
that plaintiff had "voluntarily [put] himself at so obvious a risk"43 and
therefore the manufacturer of the machine could not be held liable for
failure to install a guard rail or an additional safety switch since he
was entitled to believe that the machine would be used in its usual
manner, and need not be an insurer for the extra-ordinary risks an
operator might choose to take.44
The court agreed with plaintiff's contention that the lack of a proper
safety device could constitute a defective design subjecting the manufac-
turer to liability under section 402A.45 However, it held that this rule
of an airplane. Again the question arises, whether the responsibility is not shifted
to the assembler. It is no doubt to be expected that where there is no change in
the component part itself, but it is merely incorporated into something larger, the
strict liability will be found to carry through to the ultimate user or consumer.
But in the absence of a sufficient number of decisions on the matter to justify a
conclusion, the Institute expresses no opinion on the matter.
39. See, e.g., Rauch v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 252 Iowa 1,
104 N.W.2d 607 (1960) ; Sears v. Mund-Boilers, Inc., 336 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
40. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
41. 403 F.2d at 772 n.16. See RESTATEMENT (S4coND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment h at 351-52 (1965), which provides:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling
and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a
bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, . . . the seller
is not liable. Where, however, he has reason to anticipate that danger may result
from a particular use, . . .he may be required to give adequate warning of the
danger (see Comment j), and a product sold without such warning is in a
defective condition.
42. 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
43. Id. at 356, 247 A.2d at 606.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605. See generally Dickerson, Products Liability:
How Good Does A Product Have To Be, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967) ; Noel, Manufac-
turer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALt L.J.
816 (1962).
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is applicable only where the absence of such a device caused an injury "of
the type that could be expected from the normal use of the product. '4
Three months after the Pennsylvania supreme court's decision in
Bartkewich, the Third Circuit decided a case arising out of a similar fact
situation. In Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co.,47 the plaintiff brought
an action in strict liability to recover for injuries suffered due to a design
defect when a steel sheet-piler unexpectedly released a pile of steel which
crushed plaintiff's hand. Although the court found that the plaintiff had
voluntarily placed his hand under the piler while it was in operation, it
distinguished Bartkewich on the basis that:
In the first place, plaintiff in Bartkewich was not injured because of
a misoperation of the machine, such as here. Secondly, the court in
Bartkewich relieved the manufacturer of liability because the plaintiff
assumed an abnormal, unanticipated work position when he reached
into the machine with knowledge that the danger existed at that time.
Here, however, the evidence permits the inference that the manu-
facturer knew that employees would have to reach under the fingers
of the piler to properly perform their job.4 8
Thus, taking Bartkewich and Greco together, it can be seen that in
order for a seller to escape liability, he must show that the plaintiff volun-
tarily made some unreasonable or "abnormal" use of his product which
was not within the realm of forseeability and which the seller therefore
had no duty to anticipate and guard against.
This conclusion is further supported by Judge Fullam's recent decision
in Dyson v. General Motors Corp.4 9 There plaintiff brought an action in
both negligence and strict liability for injuries suffered when the automo-
bile in which she was a passenger left the road and overturned. Plaintiff
conceded that the alleged defect of design - the removal of full frame
doors and center-posts to create a "hardtop convertible" effect in a 1965
Buick Electra - was not the cause of the accident, but contended that the
failure of the roof to support the weight of the overturned car contributed
greatly to the extent of her injuries.
The court found that the issues involved were twofold: (1) whether
the rollover of the vehicle was forseeable (under negligence concepts) or
within the contemplated "normal use" of the product (under section 402A),
46. 432 Pa. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605. The plaintiff in Bartkewich relied on the
Illinois case of Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465(1966), where the court held that the question of whether the lack of a safety screen
which would have prevented the plaintiff from reaching into the machine to alleviate
a jammed condition constituted a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user" was for the jury. The Bartkewich court, however, while recognizing that the
decision in Wright "is legally indistinguishable" from the case at hand, chose "to
reject its result." 432 Pa. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605.
47. 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
48. Id. at 92.
49. Civil No. 43060 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 17, 1969).
754 [VOL. 14
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therefore creating a duty on the part of defendant to protect plaintiff from
such a hazard;5° and (2) if so, whether the facts alleged in plaintiff's
complaint establish a breach of that duty.
With respect to the first issue, the district court,51 citing to Bartkewich
and Greco among others, held that
a Pennsylvania court would reject the narrow concept of "intended
purpose" or "normal use" urged by defendant in this case, and would
not preclude the imposition of liability for the "second accident," i.e.,
the contact between the passenger and the interior of the vehicle. The
correct rule, in my opinion, can be stated either of two ways: (1)
50. On this issue the defendant placed particular reliance on the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836(1966). There the court held that
[tihe intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in
collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the
possibility that such accidents may occur .... We cannot agree with the plaintiff
that the defendant had a duty to equip all its automobiles with side rail perimeter
frames. . . . Defendant had a duty to test its frame only to insure that it was
reasonably fit for its intended purpose.
Id. at 825. See Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967);
Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v.
Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, placed particular reliance on the Eighth Circuit's
recent decision in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (1968), where the
plaintiff alleged a defect in design on the part of defendant as a result of the steering
column of the automobile protruding 2.7 inches forward of the front tires. The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant, finding that
the "intended use" construction urged by General Motors is much too narrow
and unrealistic. Where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes an unrea-
sonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its products, the manufacturer should
be liable for the injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care in design.
These injuries are readily foreseeable as an incident to the normal expected use
of an automobile. While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding
with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use
will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts. No rational basis exists
for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was
a causative factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually
caused by the so-called "second collision" of the passenger with the interior part
of the automobile, are all foreseeable. Where the injuries or enhanced injuries
are due to the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting
the user of its products to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence
principles should be applicable. The sole function of an automobile is not just to
provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a means of safe transportation
or as safe as reasonably possible under the present state of the art.
Id. at 502. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF.
L. RAv. 645 (1967) ; Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an "Uncrashworthy" Auto-
mobile, 52 CORNFLL L.Q. 444 (1967); Note, Liability for Negligent Automobile
Design, 52 IowA L. Rnv. 953 (1967); Note, Foreseeability in Product Design and
Duty to Warn Cases - Distinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wisc. L. Rv. 228;
80 HARV. L. Rsv. 688 (1966); 42 N.D. LAW. 111 (1966); 1966 UTAH L. R, v. 698.
51. Judge Fullam found it "interesting to note the relationship" between the
court's language in Greco, i.e., "abnormal, unanticipated work position," and that
in Bartkewich, i.e., "an accidental injury which was the type that could be expected
from normal use of the product." He found both cases to be quite consistent with
comments k and j of section 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and with
comment k of section 402A of the Restatement, all of which define intended use "to
include not only the specific use for which the product was manufactured, but also
other anticipated uses." Dyson v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 43060 at 17-18(E.D. Pa., Apr. 17, 1969).
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Vehicular accidents are so commonplace as to constitute a readily
forseeable misuse of motor vehicles; or (2) vehicular accidents are
incidental to normal and intended use of motor vehicles on today's
highways. 52
Having found that the rollover was forseeable or within the "normal
use" of an automobile, and that defendant therefore owed a duty to
plaintiff with respect to such use, the court then held that the facts as
alleged constituted a breach of that duty by stating:
[T]he law does not impose any . . . obligation [to manufacture a
"crash proof" automobile] ..... .But it is the obligation of an auto-
mobile manufacturer to provide more than merely a movable platform
capable of transporting passengers from one point to another. The
passengers must be provided a reasonably safe container within which
to make the journey. The roof is a part of such container, and, except
in the case of vehicles like convertibles . . . the roof should provide
more than merely protection against rain. 3
The court concluded by noting the difficulty that plaintiff may have
in proving the proximate cause of her injuries.5 4 However, the complaint
was sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings,55 and the action was therefore remanded to allow plaintiff to
pursue discovery.
The Dyson decision appears to extend the concept of "normal use"
under section 402A to the outer limits of foreseeability of risk. Thus, in
order for a manufacturer to avoid strict liability under section 402A, he
must show that the consequences which occurred were not readily fore-
seeable as incident to the normal use of his product.
52. Id. at 18. As an illustration of this approach to the concept of intended use,
Judge Fullam set forth the following example:[T]he manufacturer would not be held liable for the vicissitudes of using a
passenger automobile on a racetrack or a plowed field . . . but might be held
liable for the foreseeable, though accidental, traumatic consequences of the use
of passenger cars on highways by occupants.
Id. at 18-19.
53. Id. at 19-20. The defendant argued that the court's holding was equivalent to
declaring all "convertibles" unreasonably dangerous per se, at least in the absence of
roll bars. The court rejected this argument, however, finding that
all that is involved is differentiation between various models of automobile, and a
recognition of the inherent characteristics of each. The manufacturer cannot be
expected to provide a convertible which is as safe in roll-over accidents as a
standard four-door sedan with center posts and full-door frames. But the manu-
facturer can be expected to provide a convertible which is as safe as it reasonably
can be made, and which is not appreciably less safe than other convertibles. So,
too, in the present case, the manufacturer was not necessarily under an obliga-
tion to provide a hardtop model which would be as resistant to roll-over damage
as a four-door sedan; but the defendant was required, in my view, to provide a
hardtop automobile which was a reasonably safe version of such model, and which
was not substantially less safe than other hardtop models.
Id. at 20-21.
54. Compare Barber v. Kohler, 428 Pa. 219, 237 A.2d 224 (1968) and Frisch v.
Texas, 363 Pa. 618, 70 A.2d 837 (1950) with Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co.,
414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964).
55. See FtD. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
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III. CONCLUSION
In the past year, Pennsylvania courts have abolished the requirement
of vertical privity, expanded the areas of compensable loss, and held
"normal use" to be coextensive with the outer limits of foreseeable risk.
In the conclusion to the products liability comment of Volume 13 of the
Villanova Law Review, the authors recommended a "Consumer Compen-
sation" plan similar to Workman's Compensation, whereby the members
of the distributive chain "would contribute to a common fund from which
payments to compensate for defective product-caused injuries would be
made." 56 This plan was felt to be necessary in order to alleviate the
product liability cases that crowd the court calendars due to the increas-
ingly liberal means of obtaining redress. If the trend toward allowing
redress was considered liberal at the time of that comment, the past year's
decisions render it even more so. And correspondingly, since a "Consumer
Compensation" plan was thought necessary at that time, the need for it
today has increased significantly.
Warren W. Faulk
56. Comment, supra note 5, at 850.
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